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Yale University

ABSTRACT

This paper applies Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development Framework to explain how a
local dog park – the Montrose – is able to overcome communal degradation in the absence of a centralized power. In the first half of this piece, I elucidate the rules, participants, and systems that characterize this specific social-ecological system. In the second half, through a combination of park-goer interviews and analyses of online reviews, I find that the existence of high degrees of social capital between
participants, repeated interactions, entwined utilities, and the institutional diversity of a polycentric system serve to explain the effective maintenance, monitoring, and self-governance systems at the Montrose.

SECTION I: BIG QUESTIONS
To be an off-leash dog owner in the late 20th century was a frustrating condition. With the lack of open-spaces and the proliferation
of leash laws across the United States, many pet owners became
increasingly agitated at what they viewed to be state-sponsored restrictions on their otherwise unfettered right to roam. Thus, when
the city of Berkeley, California reserved a plot of open land for the
creation of an underground subway line, the air was ripe for rebellion: activists occupied the area and urged the local government to
quash the subway project and instead sanction the land as a public
space for off-leash canine enterprises (Krohe, 2005). The result was
the creation of the Ohlone Dog Park in 1979 – the world’s first public commons for dogs and their owners. Around two decades later,
in the summer of 2000, a group of individuals living in Chicago,
Illinois took the pursuits of the Ohlone activists one step further:
motivated by a love for long walks on the shore, they founded the
Montrose – Chicago’s first off-leash dog beach.
Nestled along the Eastern coast of Chicago, Illinois, the Montrose
Dog Beach is one of the most acclaimed dog “parks” in America.
With hundreds of near-perfect ratings on Yelp, the beach serves as
a paradigm for collective, public canine recreation. But how – and
under what conditions – is Montrose able to overcome the “tragedy
of the commons” in the absence of the market’s “invisible-hand”

or the sanctioning power of a centralized state? Why do individual
participants in this social-ecological system (SES) undertake costly
measures (such as obtaining the requisite shots for or cleaning up
after their pets), when they bear the brunt of the costs associated with such activities, with the resulting benefits being diffused
throughout the entire community? How, specifically, are positive
outcomes – i.e., effective maintenance, monitoring, and self-governance – pre-figured in the overarching design principles of the SES
at Montrose?

SECTION II: A USEFUL FRAMEWORK
The framework for institutional analysis that Elinor Ostrom developed in her seminal book Understanding Institutional Diversity
deconstructs these questions piecemeal. Complex systems, Ostrom
posits, can be distilled systematically and universally into several fundamental building blocks: exogenous variables, action situations, action arenas, interactions, and outcomes (Ostrom, 2009).
These exogenous factors – i.e. rules, biophysical conditions, and
community attributes – structure the patterns of interaction in an
action arena, which in turn produce outcomes evaluated along various criteria (Ostrom, 2009). An undesired outcome may then circle
back to affect the strategies, conditions, or rules governing the system (Ostrom, 2009).

Figure 1. A framework for institutional analysis, adapted from Understanding Institutional Diversity (Ostrom 2005).
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Figure 2. A visualization of the SES at Montrose.

Figure 2 visualizes Ostrom’s framework as mapped onto the SES at
Montrose. In this specific scenario, the action situation comprises
two main systems: natural and management. The natural system is
the “park,” which provides the resources, boundaries, amenities,
and landscape in which the participants operate. The management
system encompasses the norms, rules-in-use, upkeep strategies, and
monitoring techniques that govern the park. In this sense, the natural and management systems, taken together, represent the invariant backdrop of the SES at Montrose. On the other hand, the action
arena – which consists of the action situation plus an additional
social element – is constantly in flux: no two days at the beach are
precisely the same. In other words, when participants enter the action arena, Montrose transforms from a passive beach to a dynamic
system.

and fifth participant in the SES. Rules 13 and 15 indicate that age
is an important factor in determining the nature of participants at
Montrose, codifying the child (i.e. a human under 12 years of age)
and puppy (a dog under four months of age) as a sixth and seventh
participant in the system.

How, though, do individuals become valid participants in this
space? Rules 7 and 11 maintain that only dogs with a DFA (Dog
Friendly Area) tag – the possession of which signals good health
and proper vaccinations – are permitted within the beach; though
there is no fee to enter the beach itself, the tag costs $10. Rule #10
further qualifies this stipulation: a tag without its accompanying
paperwork, issued at the time of application, is insufficient. Rules
6 and 7 continue in this vein: dogs must be immunized, vaccinated,
and dewormed before entering the beach. The issue of health, it
As such, throughout this SES, Ostrom’s universal building blocks seems, is paramount at Montrose.
– exogenous variables, action arenas, and outcomes – are salient
and useful for distilling this complex system into highly digestible
pixels that can be outlined, rearranged, and repackaged into novel
theories of human behavior – a process that begins with a meticulous analysis of rules.
SECTION III: THE RULES OF THE GAME
Rules, Ostrom states, are “shared understandings by participants
about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions (or outcomes)
are required, prohibited, or permitted” (Ostrom, 2005). In other
words, rules influence, constrain, and regulate the elements of an
action arena, as outlined in the following schematic (Ostrom, 2005):
Figure 4 details the rules as they apply to the SES at Montrose
(MonDog, n.d.). In this case, the position rules are not stated explicitly, but they are implied through the various other guidelines.
For instance, rule #2 – that owners are responsible for the monitoring and safety of their dogs – establishes dogs and their owners
as two key participants in this system. Rule #4 introduces a third
participant into the arena: the Chicago police officer. Rule #8 –
which introduces both the Park District and Park Advisory Council
MonDog, comprising local volunteers – further formulates a fourth
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/27
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Figure 3. A classification of the various types of rules affecting an action
arena, sourced from Understanding Institutional Diversity (Ostrom
2005). Boundary rules specify how individuals become valid participants
in the SES, position rules delimit the various roles participants occupy,
choice rules outline the actions that a participant may undertake, aggregation rules clarify who has the authority to craft rules in the first place,
information rules affect how and what information is disseminated, payoff
rules assign costs and benefits to participants, and scope rules delimit
how actions lead to outcomes.
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mechanisms, are further fortified by external rewards (payoffs) and
sanctions (costs) associated with compliance and defection, respectively. For instance, rule #4 establishes a monetary fine on owners
who fail to clean up after their dogs, and rule #1 emphasizes liability (both monetary and legal) for injuries inflicted upon other dogs.
However, the costs of defection are not merely monetary, with rule
#1 implying that the failure to properly adhere to park regulations
may also result in physical risks to both parties. Thus, a key payoff
of compliance is the enjoyment of a safer, friendlier environment.
Moreover, rule #14 implies that caring for more than 3 dogs at once
would be stressful and unmanageable for a single owner, thereby
establishing the cons of defection and the pros of compliance from
the lens of owner experience and morale, as well.
SECTION IV: THE MONTROSE AND THE MUTT
Figure 4. The rules of Montrose, sourced from their official website.

Once participants successfully enter the beach, their actions are
constrained by several choice rules. For one, rule #2 holds that
owners must always have their dogs in eyesight to ensure their and
others’ safety; watching from outside the fence or dropping a dog
off unaccompanied is not permitted. Moreover, rule #4 states that
owners have the authority – and more than that, the obligation – to
clean up after their dogs “every time, no matter where, no matter
when;” it also gives on-duty Chicago police officers the ability to
levy fines up to $500 on owners who fail to do so (in accordance
with City of Chicago Ordinance 7-12-420). Rule #8 – which introduces the volunteer Park Advisory Council MonDog (the Montrose Dog Owners Group) – further establishes that MonDog has
the authority to oversee the maintenance (i.e. cleanliness) of the
park, inform newcomers of the rules, and resolve internal conflicts,
alerting authorities when necessary; in turn, the Chicago Park District manages the more cumbersome maintenance activities, such
as sanitizing the beach with a “beach Zamboni,” reallocating sand,
and emptying waste containers. Rule #13 holds that adults have full
jurisdiction over their children in the beach area.

The existence of rules would be meaningless in the absence of a
space upon which the rules apply. Thus, the story of Montrose now
turns to Uptown, Chicago (US – Illinois) on the northeast end of
the city. Located along the southern end of Lake Michigan, the
beach is large (around 0.7 miles long and 0.3 miles wide) and entirely fenced in on two sides, with the water serving as the third
border. Depending on the level of the lake (Montrose receives all
four seasons and a moderate amount of rain throughout the year),
there may be a small gap between the end of the fence and the water-front – a physical inevitability that reinforces the importance of
owners maintaining constant vigilance over their pets. The water is
shallow, which makes it conducive for wading (and doggy paddle).
The beach itself (Point 1 on Figure 5) consists of sand, which the
Chicago Park District regularly sweeps with the “beach Zamboni,”
a machine that sifts through and removes particulates and other refuse (MonDog, n.d).

As indicated by Point 2, there is a single, double-gated entrance to
the beach. A few hundred feet beyond, owners may enter the Mutt
Jackson cleaning facility through Point 3 (at the time this photo was
taken, the facility had not yet been constructed). Next to the Mutt
Jackson is a small parking lot (Point 4) and a grassy area (Point 5),
The above choice rules, though upheld by MonDog’s monitoring where people can escape the beach for a leisurely stroll. With these

Figure 5. A bird’s-eye view of Montrose, as captured by Google Satellite.

Figure 6. A more level view of Montrose, as taken from Yelp.
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sentiments in mind, the key questions shift from the “what” and the theories of collective behavior.
“where” to the “why” and the “how” – the subjects of the second
half of this analysis.
SECTION V: THE ENTWINEMENT THEORY

Old Ideas
In 1836, John Stuart Mill – a British political economist – penned
“On the Definition of Political Economy and the Method of Investigation Proper to it,” a seminal work which introduced the idea of an
“economic man.” The theory of Homo Economicus, as it came to
be known, characterized an individual’s behavior as “rational” only
if it advanced their own self-interest and accumulation of wealth,
luxury, and leisure (Mill, 1836). Under this view, it is assumed that
participants within an SES will as follows:
Utility1 = Benefits1 * [Compliance] – Costs1 * [Compliance]
. . . where [Compliance] is a dummy variable that equals 1 if participants comply with existing rules, “Benefits1” is a variable describing the utility a participant derives from complying with existing
rules, and “Costs1” is a variable describing the costs a participant
faces when complying with existing rules; in this case, Costs1 >
Benefits1. In other words, when a rational being is assumed to “maximize his gain,” given that the benefits of complying are dispersed
amongst all participants within a system while the associated costs
flow directly to that individual, Hardin predicts that “freedom . . .
will bring ruin to all” (Hardin, 1968).
In contrast, participants within the SES at Montrose do not appear
to behave in a manner that comports with Mill and Hardin’s ideas
of self-regarding economic preferences, whereby individuals possess incentives to free-ride on the contributions of other participants
within the system. For one, members of MonDog – Montrose’s
park advisory council – volunteer their time to oversee, maintain,
and clean the beach (on a daily basis); remind participants of park
etiquette; resolve conflicts within the SES; correspond with the
broader Chicago Park District; coordinate community events; organize fundraisers; and attend 6 board meetings per year. In fact, there
even exists a suggested donation of $50 to become a “member” of
MonDog and support its day-to-day operating expenses. Thus, this
tranche of participants at Montrose receives no monetary compensation for their services and may even lose money in the process
– a far cry from the actions expected under traditional theories of
individual behavior, which posit that the direct input costs of volunteering outweigh the dispersed benefits volunteers receive from
a clean, functioning park and given that dues-paying volunteers
maintain the option to enjoy recreation for their dogs at no charge
as standard park frequenters.
Moreover, a review written on August 10, 2019 highlights the altruistic nature of owners as participants within this SES, with Robert
M. stating that his dog jumped the fence surrounding the park only
to be stopped a half mile down the beach by a fellow participant
(Yelp, 2019). At Montrose, participants are eager to take actions on
behalf of other parties that accord no immediate benefit to themselves – another feature of this system that falls outside traditional
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/27
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“The natural system is the ‘park,’
which provides the resources, boundaries,
amenities, and landscape in which the
participants operate.”

A New Theory
On June 25, 2019, Kayla M. took to Yelp to emphatically declare that
“we LOVE this beach” (Yelp, 2019). On February 16, 2018, Summer R. incredulously expressed that she “can’t believe something
like a dog beach exists, but we are so glad it does” (Yelp, 2018). On
August 7, 2014, Marjorie F. stated approvingly that “Maggie and
I come here as often as we can weather-permitting” (Yelp, 2014).
The illuminative pattern across these narratives, one that clarifies
the collective and ostensibly altruistic nature of the interactions the
occur within this system, is the consistent use of the pronoun “we.”
In this sense, the SES at Montrose demands a nuanced interpretation of Ostrom’s framework: though traditionally treated as distinct
entities with their own unique set of incentives and aims, participants in this system – namely, dogs and owners – appear to view
themselves as conclusively entwined. In other words, participants
at Montrose tend to describe their affairs and values in terms that
connote shared, rather than discrete, experiences.
To explain this phenomenon in theoretical terms, dogs and owners in this SES are said to possess a large degree of “bridging social capital:” the trust, cohesion, connectedness, and bonds that
tie together separate groups of individuals (or participants) (Pretty, 2003). In this vein, the theoretical literature is rife; in his piece
“Are Dogs Children, Companions, or Just Animals?” David Blouin
finds that “pet owners often think of their dogs as either their children or close friends,” and in “Why Do People Love Their Pets,”
John Archer traces these parental tendencies to certain evolutionary
traits that have rendered dogs particularly well-suited to manipulating human responses (Blouin, 2013; Archer, 1997). Thus, just as
parents willingly accept the exorbitant costs of child-rearing, many
dog-owners are similarly inclined to undertake costly activities for
the benefit of their pets. With this dynamic in mind, the story of
Montrose becomes one of patronage, which alters the aforementioned utility equation in the following ways . . .
Utility2 = (Benefits1 + E2) * [Compliance] – Costs1 * [Compliance]
. . . where the additional factor E2, which I term the “entwinement
factor,” accounts for the fact that the interests of owners and dogs
within this SES are entwined, with the presence of a happy dog
granting an owner with an additional unit of utility: the interests of
the pet are themselves in the interest of the focal individual. Under
this condition, an individual will comply with the system’s rules if
(Benefits1 + E2) > Costs1. As stated above, one key determinant of
the factor E2 is the high degree of bridging social capital between
dogs and their owners – a phenomenon that explains owners’ inclinations to purchase DFA tags, schedule veterinary appointments,
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Figure 7. A visualization of polycentricity at Montrose.

and maintain constant vigilance over their pets whilst within the SECTION VI: DOGGED MONITORING AND A POLYCENTRIC
confines of the beach.
SYSTEM
A second variable that flows into E2 stems less from the standpoint
of patronage and more from one of self-interested gratification. In
an interview via email on November 11, 2019, Shelly Burke – the
social media chair of the MonDog Advisory Council – had this to
say about why she joined the volunteer organization a little over
nine years ago: “I enjoy being able to photograph the pups (not in
a professional capacity) and sharing them on social media.” Speaking about a fellow board member, Burke said “recently, another . . .
has helped because they are there all the time with their nine-yearold black lab/Anatolian Shepherd mix, Sadie.” Burke’s comments
illuminate one particular channel through which the SES at Montrose manages to solve the second-order collective action problem
– that is, the threat of free-riding in the creation and maintenance
of the sanctioning system, which itself is a public good (Oliver,
1980). Though Burke and her colleague gain little in the way of
monetary or temporal value from their involvement with MonDog,
they participate anyways by virtue of the sheer joy they receive
from seeing, taking pictures of, and spending time with dogs (both
their own and those of others).

Polycentricity – as defined in Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout,
and Robert Warren’s “The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas” – is the idea that the amalgamation of autonomous
yet interdependent decision-making entities within an SES, though
complex, need not devolve into chaos (Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren,
1961). This principle certainly holds within the context of Montrose, where the many layers of diversity (both individual and institutional) serve to constrain, alter, and shape behavior within the
SES in such a way as to maintain its effective maintenance, monitoring, and governance. Figure 7 illustrates the nature of polycentricity as it applies to Montrose.
The first tranche of self-imposed administration exists between
dogs themselves. As illustrated through various accounts, large
dogs frequently “play rough” and “work out their energies with
each other” (Yelp, 2018). One woman went as far as to say that
her Chihuahua Peanut, as a result of his participation at Montrose,
“has slowly become more sociable and has even been able to walk
with me along the beach without being rude to other dogs . . . [becoming] more gentlemanly in his mannerisms and able to respect
the other dogs around him” (Yelp, 2017). Thus, at Montrose, dogs
sanction other dogs that they perceive to be acting in an unruly and
agitating manner. In this way, Montrose benefits from dogs’ evolutionary instincts for socialization and self-preservation.

A third variable that impacts the entwinement factor (E2) is the occurrence of repeated interactions, which tends to deter behavior that
falls outside of Montrose’s established norms. As Karla A. noted in
her July 14, 2016 review of the beach, “if you go often, you’ll get
to know the ‘regulars.’ Avoid peak hours if you don’t want to deal
with the few careless owners who hang out with friends, tan, etc. A second level of authority within this system exists at the anthroand forget to watch their dogs” (Yelp, 2016). Moreover, when Jas- pomorphic scale, with owners monitoring the behavior of both their
min T. was a “little bit nervous because of my rambunctious pup,” dogs and that of other owners. As illustrated above (i.e. in section
she “made friends with some people there and they convinced us IV), owners’ utility functions are linked with the well-being of their
that it was safe” (Yelp, 2015). Jennifer G. expresses a similar ac- pets, which creates an incentive to “keep an eye on your dog” lest
count of solidarity within the SES: “the one time I saw an aggres- “lose him/her very fast” (Yelp, 2019). As a result, when disputes
sive dog there, people joined together and politely informed the between dogs fail to resolve themselves peacefully, there remains
owner that the dog needed to leave” (Yelp, 2015). Thus, it appears an additional layer of human intervention to maintain order in the
that the presence of repeated interactions within Montrose culti- beach. The following statement from Rosalie C. – that in her “3
vates a strong sense of amicability, unity, and community amongst years of going there [Montrose], I know there is one dog my dog
participants (namely owners), thereby driving owners to sustain the does not get along with and I just leave the park” – sheds light upon
sanctioning and mutual monitoring practices of the system.
additional strategies that owners have developed over time to effecPublished by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2021
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tively pre-empt tumultuous dog-on-dog scuffles and a subsequent
disintegration of order within the SES (Yelp, 2016). In this vein, the
anecdotes of solidarity expressed in Karla, Jasmin, and Jennifer’s
reviews (as depicted in section VI) illustrate the catalyzing effect
of repeated interactions on mutual monitoring practices between
owners themselves: those who fail to keep close watch on their pets
are collectively and publicly confronted.
On a more institutional level, the MonDog Advisory Council and
the Chicago Park District serve as two key players that preside over
owners and their dogs. Of the two, MonDog interacts more directly with participants, spearheading beach cleanups, disseminating
information regarding beach etiquette, providing waste bags, and
organizing events to bolster community relations (MonDog, n.d.).
In this sense, MonDog acts as the outward facing representative
of Montrose, establishing a sense of external governance above
and beyond the dogs and owners themselves. In contrast, the Park
District operates as more of a behind-the-scenes, logistical body
– collecting waste containers, reallocating sand, and operating the
“beach Zamboni” (MonDog, n.d.). With the vast majority of its
funds stemming from fundraisers and donations, MonDog alone
would not be able to absorb the expenses associated with the larger
maintenance activities of the beach. Similarly, the existence of a
Park District in the absence of MonDog would deprive participants
of critical public services. Thus, the presence of institutional diversity at Montrose provides participants with a more robust and
effective governance structure.
The role of the police officer within this SES is slightly more puzzling. Of the Park’s 255 reviews, only one man mentioned the police at all, and even he merely wished to gripe over their seeming
lack of a presence in the park: speaking of a recent altercation, he
wrote that “the police were called 10-12 times and he got away.”
There are two plausible interpretations of this phenomenon. For
one, it could be that the perceived threat of an overarching entity
with legal and monetary sanctioning powers serves to proactively
deter infractions. In game theoretic terms, this is to say that the
police serve as a “credible threat” whose mere presence (or the perception of their presence) coerces participants into compliance. On
the other hand, it is possible that the police do, in fact, maintain an
active function at the beach, but affected parties are – for whatever reason – systematically under-represented in the online reviews.
This distinction is important but one that is admittedly difficult to
parse out. Regardless, it stands that the Chicago police force represents one layer of the self-governing, institutionally diverse SES
at Montrose.
SECTION VII: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Frequenters of Montrose generally agree that the park is clean,
well-run, and a little crowded but an overall pleasant experience
for both dogs and their owners. Though violations of the existing
rules do occur, none pose an existential threat to the order, maintenance, and sustainability of the system. With high degrees of social
capital between participants, the reality of repeated interactions, the
existence of entwined utilities, and the institutional diversity of a
polycentric system, Montrose Dog Beach is a positively complex,
dynamic, and ultimately self-sustaining SES – as one patron put it,
a bustling space of “beautiful chaos” (Yelp, 2018).
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/27
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